title: Artificial distinction and real discrimination.
abstract: In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.
authors.affiliation: BRiDGE, Foundations of Economic Analysis I, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), E-48015 Bilbao, Spain. elena.inarra@ehu.es
authors.forename: Elena
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Inarra
authors.forename: Annick
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Laruelle
mesh_terms: D000374:Aggression; D000818:Animals; D001522:Behavior, Animal; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003163:Competitive Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008957:Models, Genetic; D011200:Poultry