title: Reply to Marquis: how things stand with the 'future like ours' argument.
abstract: In an earlier essay in this journal I critiqued Don Marquis's well-known argument against abortion. I distinguished two versions of Marquis's argument, which I refer to as 'the essence argument' and 'the sufficient condition argument'. I presented two counterexamples showing that the essence argument was mistaken, and I argued that the sufficient condition argument should be rejected because Marquis had not adequately responded to an important objection to it. In response to my critique, Marquis put forward in this journal a revised version of his argument. In his modified approach he no longer advocates the essence argument and he offers a new version of the sufficient condition argument. In the current essay, I discuss how Marquis's revised argument deals with my original objections, and I argue that his new sufficient condition argument is unsuccessful.
authors.affiliation: Department of Medicine, University of Tennessee Health Science Center, 956 Court Avenue, Suite G212, Memphis, Tennessee 38163, USA. cstrong@uthsc.edu
authors.forename: Carson
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Strong
mesh_terms: D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics*; D033421:Beginning of Human Life / Q000941:ethics*; D005260:Female; D006708:Homicide / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D028723:Personhood; D011247:Pregnancy; D026712:Value of Life