title: How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): comment on Bowers and Davis (2012).
abstract: Bowers and Davis (2012) criticize Bayesian modelers for telling "just so" stories about cognition and neuroscience. Their criticisms are weakened by not giving an accurate characterization of the motivation behind Bayesian modeling or the ways in which Bayesian models are used and by not evaluating this theoretical framework against specific alternatives. We address these points by clarifying our beliefs about the goals and status of Bayesian models and by identifying what we view as the unique merits of the Bayesian approach.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1650, USA. tom_griffiths@berkeley.edu
authors.forename: Thomas L
authors.initials: TL
authors.lastname: Griffiths
authors.forename: Nick
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Chater
authors.forename: Dennis
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Norris
authors.forename: Alexandre
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Pouget
mesh_terms: D001499:Bayes Theorem; D006801:Humans; D008606:Mental Processes / Q000502:physiology*; D009488:Neurosciences; D011582:Psychological Theory; D011584:Psychology