title: Hysteresis effects of changing the parameters of noncooperative games.
abstract: We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of statistical physics to instead derive equilibria of bounded rational game theory. We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by gradually imposing individual-specific tax rates on the players of the game, and then gradually removing those taxes, the players move from a poor equilibrium to one that is better for all of them.
authors.affiliation: Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, USA. david.h.wolpert@nasa.gov
authors.forename: David H
authors.initials: DH
authors.lastname: Wolpert
authors.forename: Michael
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Harré
authors.forename: Eckehard
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Olbrich
authors.forename: Nils
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Bertschinger
authors.forename: Jürgen
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Jost