title: Evolution of cooperation driven by reputation-based migration.
abstract: How cooperation emerges and is stabilized has been a puzzling problem to biologists and sociologists since Darwin. One of the possible answers to this problem lies in the mobility patterns. These mobility patterns in previous works are either random-like or driven by payoff-related properties such as fitness, aspiration, or expectation. Here we address another force which drives us to move from place to place: reputation. To this end, we propose a reputation-based model to explore the effect of migration on cooperation in the contest of the prisoner's dilemma. In this model, individuals earn their reputation scores through previous cooperative behaviors. An individual tends to migrate to a new place if he has a neighborhood of low reputation. We show that cooperation is promoted for relatively large population density and not very large temptation to defect. A higher mobility sensitivity to reputation is always better for cooperation. A longer reputation memory favors cooperation, provided that the corresponding mobility sensitivity to reputation is strong enough. The microscopic perception of the effect of this mechanism is also given. Our results may shed some light on the role played by migration in the emergence and persistence of cooperation.
authors.affiliation: MOE Key Laboratory of Electronic Equipment Structure Design, School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an, China. congrui0000@126.com
authors.forename: Rui
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Cong
authors.forename: Bin
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Wu
authors.forename: Yuanying
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Qiu
authors.forename: Long
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Wang
mesh_terms: D004641:Emigration and Immigration; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical