Perceptual simulations can be as expressive as first-order logic.
Theories asserting that human reasoning is based on perceptual simulations often suppose these simulations are of concrete individual objects and the specific relations that hold among them. However, much human knowledge involves assertions about which relations do not hold, generalities over large numbers of objects and conditional facts. Can simulation theories explain how the mind represents these forms of knowledge, or are they inferior in their expressive power to knowledge representation schemes based on logical formalisms designed specifically to deal with negative, conditional and quantificational knowledge? In this paper, we show how assertions about mental simulations can in fact straightforwardly express all the concepts that comprise first-order logic, including negation, conditionals and both universal and existential quantification. We also speculate on how to extend this approach to deal with probabilistic and more expressive logics.
Cognitive Science Department, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180, USA. uchidh@rpi.edu
Hiroyuki
H
Uchida
Nicholas L
NL
Cassimatis
J R
JR
Scally
D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology*