Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in the great apes.
We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, SE-22100 Lund, Sweden. Mathias.Osvath@lucs.lu.se
Mathias
M
Osvath
Tomas
T
Persson
Peter
P
Gärdenfors
D000818:Animals; D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D011597:Psychomotor Performance; D013672:Technology; D053001:Tool Use Behavior