Evolution, safety, and highly pathogenic influenza viruses.
Experience with influenza has shown that predictions of virus phenotype or fitness from nucleotide sequence are imperfect and that predicting the timing and course of evolution is extremely difficult. Such uncertainty means that the risk of experiments with mammalian-transmissible, possibly highly virulent influenza viruses remains high even if some aspects of their laboratory biology are reassuring; it also implies limitations on the ability of laboratory observations to guide interpretation of surveillance of strains in the field. Thus, we propose that future experiments with virulent pathogens whose accidental or deliberate release could lead to extensive spread in human populations should be limited by explicit risk-benefit considerations.
Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics and Department of Epidemiology, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. mlipsitc@hsph.harvard.edu
Marc
M
Lipsitch
Joshua B
JB
Plotkin
Lone
L
Simonsen
Barry
B
Bloom
D000818:Animals; D000940:Antigenic Variation; D000956:Antigens, Viral; D000998:Antiviral Agents / Q000494:pharmacology / Q000627:therapeutic use; D055885:Biohazard Release; D003264:Containment of Biohazards; D024882:Drug Resistance, Viral; D019143:Evolution, Molecular; D005289:Ferrets; D006801:Humans; D053124:Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype / Q000235:genetics / Q000472:pathogenicity*; D009980:Influenza A virus / Q000187:drug effects / Q000235:genetics / Q000276:immunology / Q000472:pathogenicity*; D007251:Influenza, Human / Q000188:drug therapy / Q000635:transmission / Q000821:virology*; D007757:Laboratory Infection / Q000453:epidemiology; D009154:Mutation; D009976:Orthomyxoviridae Infections / Q000635:transmission / Q000821:virology*; D011640:Public Policy; D018570:Risk Assessment; D012449:Safety; D012637:Security Measures; D014481:United States / Q000453:epidemiology
D000956:Antigens, Viral; D000998:Antiviral Agents