Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict.
We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Germany. kai.konrad@tax.mpg.de
Kai A
KA
Konrad
Florian
F
Morath
D000533:Altruism; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003220:Conflict, Psychological; D005716:Game Theory; D006126:Group Processes; D006801:Humans; D008957:Models, Genetic