Attention in a bayesian framework.
The behavioral phenomena of sensory attention are thought to reflect the allocation of a limited processing resource, but there is little consensus on the nature of the resource or why it should be limited. Here we argue that a fundamental bottleneck emerges naturally within Bayesian models of perception, and use this observation to frame a new computational account of the need for, and action of, attention - unifying diverse attentional phenomena in a way that goes beyond previous inferential, probabilistic and Bayesian models. Attentional effects are most evident in cluttered environments, and include both selective phenomena, where attention is invoked by cues that point to particular stimuli, and integrative phenomena, where attention is invoked dynamically by endogenous processing. However, most previous Bayesian accounts of attention have focused on describing relatively simple experimental settings, where cues shape expectations about a small number of upcoming stimuli and thus convey "prior" information about clearly defined objects. While operationally consistent with the experiments it seeks to describe, this view of attention as prior seems to miss many essential elements of both its selective and integrative roles, and thus cannot be easily extended to complex environments. We suggest that the resource bottleneck stems from the computational intractability of exact perceptual inference in complex settings, and that attention reflects an evolved mechanism for approximate inference which can be shaped to refine the local accuracy of perception. We show that this approach extends the simple picture of attention as prior, so as to provide a unified and computationally driven account of both selective and integrative attentional phenomena.
Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London London, UK.
Louise
L
Whiteley
Maneesh
M
Sahani