Updating: learning versus supposing.
Bayesian orthodoxy posits a tight relationship between conditional probability and updating. Namely, the probability of an event A after learning B should equal the conditional probability of A given B prior to learning B. We examine whether ordinary judgment conforms to the orthodox view. In three experiments we found substantial differences between the conditional probability of an event A supposing an event B compared to the probability of A after having learned B. Specifically, supposing B appears to have less impact on the credibility of A than learning that B is true.
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, United States. jiayingz@princeton.edu
Jiaying
J
Zhao
Vincenzo
V
Crupi
Katya
K
Tentori
Branden
B
Fitelson
Daniel
D
Osherson
D000465:Algorithms; D003627:Data Interpretation, Statistical; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007858:Learning / Q000502:physiology*; D008297:Male; D008606:Mental Processes / Q000502:physiology*; D010775:Photic Stimulation; D011336:Probability; D055815:Young Adult