title: Dworkin's paradox.
abstract: How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the coordination among them. Based on a simple assumption that an individual's welfare is proportional to how her preference is fulfilled by the actual distribution, we show that an egalitarian preference is a strict Nash equilibrium and can be favorable even in certain inhomogeneous situations. These suggest how communication can encourage and secure a notion of fairness.
authors: Integrated Science Laboratory, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden.
authors: Seung Ki
authors: SK
authors: Baek
authors: Jung-Kyoo
authors: JK
authors: Choi
authors: Beom Jun
authors: BJ
authors: Kim
mesh_terms: D003657:Decision Making / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D009014:Morals; D040841:Resource Allocation / Q000941:ethics*; D012935:Social Justice