title: Causal reasoning, causal probabilities, and conceptions of causation.
abstract: The present paper deals with the tools that can be used to represent causation and to reason about it and, specifically, with their diversity. It focuses on so-called "causal probabilities"--that is, probabilities of effects given one of their causes--and critically surveys a recent paper in which Joyce (2010) argues that the values of these probabilities do not depend on one's conception of causation. I first establish a stronger independence claim: I show that the very definition of causal probabilities is independent of one's conception of causation. Second, I investigate whether causal probabilities indeed take the same values under their different possible definitions.
authors: Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris 4, 1 rue Victor Cousin, 75 230 Paris cedex 05, France. isabelle.drouet@paris-sorbonne.fr
authors: Isabelle
authors: I
authors: Drouet
mesh_terms: D015984:Causality; D003210:Concept Formation; D011336:Probability