title: Causal imprinting in causal structure learning.
abstract: Suppose one observes a correlation between two events, B and C, and infers that B causes C. Later one discovers that event A explains away the correlation between B and C. Normatively, one should now dismiss or weaken the belief that B causes C. Nonetheless, participants in the current study who observed a positive contingency between B and C followed by evidence that B and C were independent given A, persisted in believing that B causes C. The authors term this difficulty in revising initially learned causal structures "causal imprinting." Throughout four experiments, causal imprinting was obtained using multiple dependent measures and control conditions. A Bayesian analysis showed that causal imprinting may be normative under some conditions, but causal imprinting also occurred in the current study when it was clearly non-normative. It is suggested that causal imprinting occurs due to the influence of prior knowledge on how reasoners interpret later evidence. Consistent with this view, when participants first viewed the evidence showing that B and C are independent given A, later evidence with only B and C did not lead to the belief that B causes C.
authors.affiliation: Yale University, Psychology Department, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06520, United States. eric.taylor@yale.edu
authors.forename: Eric G
authors.initials: EG
authors.lastname: Taylor
authors.forename: Woo-Kyoung
authors.initials: WK
authors.lastname: Ahn
mesh_terms: D001245:Association Learning; D001499:Bayes Theorem; D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D007173:Imprinting, Psychological; D007600:Judgment; D008960:Models, Psychological