The "H5N1 publication case" and its conclusions.
The request of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to the editors of the scientific journals SCIENCE and NATURE not to publish details on the modified H5N1-virus has surprisingly not caused a discussion on censorship within the scientific community (NSABB, 2012a, P.1). This may show that science generally acknowledges the necessity to cut out sensitive data from research results in publications that may serve as a manual for weapons of mass destruction. In this article the policy of the NSABB and the reaction of the scientific community is discussed, as well as the meaning of censorship in dual use research and how an appropriate organisation of future surveillance in sensitive science fields could be organised: To guarantee future undisturbed work in sensitive science fields, the establishment of an internationally organised frame for scientists dealing with dual-use-research is suggested.
Group for Bio-Ethics in Life Sciences, Faculty of Biochemistry, Biophysics and Biotechnology, Jagiellonian University Kraków, Poland. gregor.becker@uj.edu.pl
Gregor
G
Becker
D026683:Advisory Committees / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D035843:Biomedical Research / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D023482:Bioterrorism / Q000517:prevention & control; D032984:Ethics, Research; D005814:Genes, Viral; D006801:Humans; D053124:Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype / Q000235:genetics* / Q000472:pathogenicity; D007251:Influenza, Human / Q000821:virology; D011643:Publishing / Q000941:ethics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D014481:United States