title: Evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks.
abstract: We study evolutionary game dynamics on structured populations in which individuals take part in several layers of networks of interactions simultaneously. This multiplex of interdependent networks accounts for the different kind of social ties each individual has. By coupling the evolutionary dynamics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game in each of the networks, we show that the resilience of cooperative behaviors for extremely large values of the temptation to defect is enhanced by the multiplex structure. Furthermore, this resilience is intrinsically related to a non-trivial organization of cooperation across the network layers, thus providing a new way out for cooperation to survive in structured populations.
authors.affiliation: Departamento de Física de la Materia Condensada, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza 50009, Spain. gardenes@gmail.com
authors.forename: Jesús
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Gómez-Gardeñes
authors.forename: Irene
authors.initials: I
authors.lastname: Reinares
authors.forename: Alex
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Arenas
authors.forename: Luis Mario
authors.initials: LM
authors.lastname: Floría
mesh_terms: D000465:Algorithms; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008954:Models, Biological; D017711:Nonlinear Dynamics; D016012:Poisson Distribution