title: Environmental justice, values, and scientific expertise.
abstract: This essay compares two philosophical proposals concerning the relation between values and science, both of which reject the value-free ideal but nevertheless place restrictions on how values and science should interact. The first of these proposals relies on a distinction between the direct and indirect roles of values, while the second emphasizes instead a distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. We consider these two proposals in connection with a case study of disputed research on the topic of environmental justice and argue that the second proposal has several advantages over the first.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, USA.
authors.forename: Daniel
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Steel
authors.forename: Kyle Powys
authors.initials: KP
authors.lastname: Whyte
mesh_terms: D003709:Democracy; D004777:Environment; D055317:Evidence-Based Practice; D006801:Humans; D019359:Knowledge; D010811:Natural Science Disciplines; D012935:Social Justice; D012945:Social Values