title: The time of death's badness.
abstract: Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased--a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues--need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which my death is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm.
authors.affiliation: Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden. jens.johansson@filosofi.uu.se
authors.forename: Jens
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Johansson
mesh_terms: D001293:Attitude to Death; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D001675:Bioethics; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D019369:Life; D028723:Personhood