title: Species, essence and explanation.
abstract: Michael Devitt (2008, 2010) has argued that species have intrinsic essences. This paper rebuts Devitt's arguments, but in so doing it shores up the anti-essentialist consensus in two ways that have more general interest. First, species membership can be explanatory even when species have no essences; that is, Tamsin's membership of the tiger species can explain her stripyness, without this committing us to any further claim about essential properties of tigers. Second, even the views of species that appear most congenial to essentialism-namely phenetic and genotypic cluster accounts-do not entail strong forms of intrinsic essentialism.
authors.affiliation: University of Cambridge, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, United Kingdom. tml1000@cam.ac.uk
authors.forename: Tim
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Lewens
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005838:Genotype; D008678:Metaphysics; D013045:Species Specificity; D046010:Tigers