title: Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication.
abstract: Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890, USA. kzollman@andrew.cmu.edu
authors.forename: Kevin J S
authors.initials: KJ
authors.lastname: Zollman
authors.forename: Carl T
authors.initials: CT
authors.lastname: Bergstrom
authors.forename: Simon M
authors.initials: SM
authors.lastname: Huttegger
mesh_terms: D000819:Animal Communication; D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003220:Conflict, Psychological; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological