title: Aspects of research and development contract terms in the bio/pharmaceutical sector.
abstract: OBJECTIVE
  The cost of new drug development is increasing every year. Pharmaceutical companies use R&D joint ventures, mergers, and outsource different stages of pharmaceutical R&D activities for a faster and cost minimizing method of innovation. Pharmaceutical companies outsource R&D activities to independent small biotech or pharmaceutical companies that specialize in different stages of pharmaceutical R&D. This chapter examines the determinants of the payment structure of research contracts between large bio/pharmaceutical companies and specialized research firms.
  
  
  METHODS
  Determinants of R&D contracts are analyzed using detailed R&D contract data between bio/pharmaceutical companies and independent research firms for 10 years. A multinomial logit model is used in order to understand the determinants of three different types of contracts; royalty contracts, fixed payment contracts, and the mixed contracts.
  
  
  RESULTS
  Under uncertainty, the likelihood of a royalty contract rises for the early stages of the research and with the patent stock of the research firm. It is more likely to observe both royalty and fixed payment if the pharmaceutical client has past contracts with the same research firm. The results also suggest that if Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is more stringent in any disease area in reviewing the new drug application, then the likelihood of signing pure royalty contract decreases.
  
  
  CONCLUSIONS
  Understanding the nature of R&D contracts and the effects of FDA's behavior on the pharmaceutical R&D contract is important because these contracts not only affect the cost of new drug invention but also the quality and the rate of invention. VALUE: Results are useful for both the pharmaceutical companies and the economic/business researchers.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Auburn University, AL, USA.
authors.forename: Tannista
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Banerjee
mesh_terms: D032982:Contracts / Q000191:economics*; D017277:Drug Approval; D004345:Drug Industry; D036262:Empirical Research; D016015:Logistic Models; D020416:Outsourced Services / Q000191:economics; D012106:Research / Q000458:organization & administration*; D014481:United States; D014486:United States Food and Drug Administration