title: Resilience to leaking--dynamic systems modeling of information security.
abstract: Leaking of confidential material is a major threat to information security within organizations and to society as a whole. This insight has gained traction in the political realm since the activities of Wikileaks, which hopes to attack 'unjust' systems or 'conspiracies'. Eventually, such threats to information security rely on a biologistic argument on the benefits and drawbacks that uncontrolled leaking might pose for 'just' and 'unjust' entities. Such biological metaphors are almost exclusively based on the economic advantage of participants. Here, I introduce a mathematical model of the complex dynamics implied by leaking. The complex interactions of adversaries are modeled by coupled logistic equations including network effects of econo-communication networks. The modeling shows, that there might arise situations where the leaking envisioned and encouraged by Wikileaks and the like can strengthen the defending entity (the 'conspiracy'). In particular, the only severe impact leaking can have on an organization seems to originate in the exploitation of leaks by another entity the organization competes with. Therefore, the model suggests that leaks can be used as a `tactical mean' in direct adversary relations, but do not necessarily increase public benefit and societal immunization to 'conspiracies'. Furthermore, within the model the exploitation of the (open) competition between entities seems to be a more promising approach to control malicious organizations : divide-et-impera policies triumph here.
authors.affiliation: Department of Physics, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany. hamacher@bio.tu-darmstadt.de
authors.forename: Kay
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Hamacher
mesh_terms: D007255:Information Services; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D018907:Privacy