title: More questions for mirror neurons.
abstract: The mirror neuron system is widely held to provide direct access to the motor goals of others. This paper critically investigates this idea, focusing on the so-called 'intentional worry'. I explore two answers to the intentional worry: first that the worry is premised on too limited an understanding of mirror neuron behaviour (Sections 2 and 3), second that the appeal made to mirror neurons can be refined in such a way as to avoid the worry (Section 4). I argue that the first response requires an account of the mechanism by which small-scale gestures are supposedly mapped to larger chains of actions but that none of the extant accounts of this mechanism are plausible. Section 4 then briefly examines refinements of the mirror neuron-mindreading hypothesis which avoid the intentional worry. I conclude that these refinements may well be plausible but that they undermine many of the claims standardly made for mirror neurons.
authors.affiliation: Philosophy Department, University of Reading, Reading RG6 6AA, UK. Electronic address: e.g.n.borg@reading.ac.uk.
authors.forename: Emma
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Borg
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005868:Gestures; D000882:Haplorhini; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D059167:Mirror Neurons / Q000502:physiology*; D009043:Motor Activity; D012938:Social Perception; D056345:Theory of Mind / Q000502:physiology*