title: The representation of abstract words: what matters? Reply to Paivio's (2013) comment on Kousta et al. (2011).
abstract: In Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, and Del Campo (2011), we presented an embodied theory of semantic representation, which crucially included abstract concepts as internally embodied via affective states. Paivio (2013) took issue with our treatment of dual coding theory, our reliance on data from lexical decision, and our theoretical proposal. Here, we address these different issues and clarify how our findings offer a way to move forward in the investigation of how abstract concepts are represented.
authors: Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences Research Department.
authors: Gabriella
authors: G
authors: Vigliocco
authors: Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
authors: Stavroula
authors: 0000-0002-4664-9628
authors: S
authors: Kousta
authors: Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences Research Department.
authors: David
authors: D
authors: Vinson
authors: Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences Research Department.
authors: Mark
authors: M
authors: Andrews
authors: Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences Research Department.
authors: Elena
authors: E
authors: Del Campo
mesh_terms: D003210:Concept Formation / Q000502:physiology*; D004644:Emotions / Q000502:physiology*; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D012660:Semantics