title: Memory attacks on device-independent quantum cryptography.
abstract: Device-independent quantum cryptographic schemes aim to guarantee security to users based only on the output statistics of any components used, and without the need to verify their internal functionality. Since this would protect users against untrustworthy or incompetent manufacturers, sabotage, or device degradation, this idea has excited much interest, and many device-independent schemes have been proposed. Here we identify a critical weakness of device-independent protocols that rely on public communication between secure laboratories. Untrusted devices may record their inputs and outputs and reveal information about them via publicly discussed outputs during later runs. Reusing devices thus compromises the security of a protocol and risks leaking secret data. Possible defenses include securely destroying or isolating used devices. However, these are costly and often impractical. We propose other more practical partial defenses as well as a new protocol structure for device-independent quantum key distribution that aims to achieve composable security in the case of two parties using a small number of devices to repeatedly share keys with each other (and no other party).
authors: Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, United Kingdom. jonathan.barrett@cs.ox.ac.uk
authors: Jonathan
authors: J
authors: Barrett
authors: Roger
authors: R
authors: Colbeck
authors: Adrian
authors: A
authors: Kent