title: Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias.
abstract: I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's position has the potential to offer more. However, I question Persson and Savulescu's proposal of compulsory moral enhancement (a conception they used to promote), proposing the alternative of voluntary moral enhancement.
authors: Vojin
authors: V
authors: Rakić
mesh_terms: D015982:Bias; D005610:Freedom; D024861:Genetic Enhancement; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D009014:Morals; D013850:Thinking; D014836:Volition
keywords: Enhancement; Neuroethics; Philosophical Ethics; Political Philosophy; Psychopharmacology