title: Intertemporal bargaining predicts moral behavior, even in anonymous, one-shot economic games.
abstract: To the extent that acting fairly is in an individual’s long-term interest, short-term impulses to cheat present a self-control problem. The only effective solution is to interpret the problem as a variant of repeated prisoner’s dilemma, with each choice as a test case predicting future choices. Moral choice appears to be the product of a contract because it comes from self-enforcing intertemporal cooperation.
authors: School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. George.Ainslie@va.gov
authors: George
authors: G
authors: Ainslie
mesh_terms: D002755:Choice Behavior; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D008393:Marriage; D009014:Morals; D012747:Sexual Partners