title: Evolution of collective action in adaptive social structures.
abstract: Many problems in nature can be conveniently framed as a problem of evolution of collective cooperative behaviour, often modelled resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory in well-mixed populations, combined with an appropriate N-person dilemma. Yet, the well-mixed assumption fails to describe the population dynamics whenever individuals have a say in deciding which groups they will participate. Here we propose a simple model in which dynamical group formation is described as a result of a topological evolution of a social network of interactions. We show analytically how evolutionary dynamics under public goods games in finite adaptive networks can be effectively transformed into a N-Person dilemma involving both coordination and co-existence. Such dynamics would be impossible to foresee from more conventional 2-person interactions as well as from descriptions based on infinite, well-mixed populations. Finally, we show how stochastic effects help rendering cooperation viable, promoting polymorphic configurations in which cooperators prevail.
authors.affiliation: ATP-group, CMAF, Instituto para a Investigação Interdisciplinar, P-1649-003 Lisboa Codex, Portugal.
authors.forename: João A
authors.initials: JA
authors.lastname: Moreira
authors.forename: Jorge M
authors.initials: JM
authors.lastname: Pacheco
authors.forename: Francisco C
authors.initials: FC
authors.lastname: Santos
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011157:Population Dynamics