title: Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?
abstract: According to the theory of 'promiscuous teleology', humans are naturally biased to (mistakenly) construe natural kinds as if they (like artifacts) were intentionally designed 'for a purpose'. However, this theory introduces two paradoxes. First, if infants readily distinguish natural kinds from artifacts, as evidence suggests, why do school-aged children erroneously conflate this distinction? Second, if Western scientific education is required to overcome promiscuous teleological reasoning, how can one account for the ecological expertise of non-Western educated, indigenous people? Here, we develop an alternative 'relational-deictic' interpretation, proposing that the teleological stance may not index a deep-rooted belief that nature was designed for a purpose, but instead may reflect an appreciation of the perspectival relations among living things and their environments.
authors.affiliation: Psychology Department, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road-102 Swift Hall, Evanston, IL 60208-2710, USA. bethanyojalehto2015@u.northwestern.edu
authors.forename: Bethany
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Ojalehto
authors.forename: Sandra R
authors.initials: SR
authors.lastname: Waxman
authors.forename: Douglas L
authors.initials: DL
authors.lastname: Medin
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D019368:Nature; D010684:Philosophy; D011582:Psychological Theory