title: How to understand a woman's obligations to the fetus in unwanted pregnancies.
abstract: Some have challenged Thomson's case of the famous unconscious violinist (UV) by arguing that in cases of consensual sex a woman is partially morally responsible for the existence of a needy fetus; since she is partially responsible she ought to assist the fetus, and so abortion is morally wrong. Call this the Responsibility Objection (RO) to UV. In this paper, I briefly criticize one of the most widely discussed objections to RO and then suggest a new way to challenge RO. In so doing, I investigate the plausibility of the moral principle that appears to be driving RO: If a woman is partially morally responsible for the existence of a needy fetus, she has a moral obligation to assist the fetus. I argue that this principle is false. I suggest modified versions of this principle but argue that, even on the most plausible version, RO does not persuade.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Towson University, 8000 York Rd, Towson, MD 21252, USA. khine@towson.edu
authors.forename: Kristen
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Hine
mesh_terms: D026689:Ethical Analysis; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D033261:Maternal-Fetal Relations / Q000523:psychology*; D028681:Moral Obligations; D011247:Pregnancy; D049168:Pregnancy, Unplanned / Q000941:ethics* / Q000523:psychology*; D037841:Pregnant People / Q000523:psychology*; D012941:Social Responsibility