title: Weight for Stephen Finlay.
abstract: According to Stephen Finlay, 'Aought toX' means thatX-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of 'ought' is hard to square with a theory of a reason's weight which could explain why 'Aought toX' logically entails that the balance of reasons favours thatAX-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that 'Aought toX' logically entails that the balance of reasons favours thatAX-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13a, 3512BL Utrecht, The Netherlands.
authors.forename: Daan
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Evers
keywords: Expected utility theory; Moral semantics; Ought; Reasons; Stephen Finlay; Weight of reasons