title: Multiple realizability and biological laws.
abstract: We critically analyze Alexander Rosenberg's argument based on the multiple realizability of biological properties that there are no biological laws. The argument is intuitive and suggestive. Nevertheless, a closer analysis reveals that the argument rests on dubious assumptions about the nature of natural selection, laws of nature, and multiple realizability. We also argue that the argument is limited in scope, since it applies to an outmoded account of laws and the applicability of the argument to other more promising accounts of laws is questionable. Another concern of ours is that the relation between multiple realizability and natural selection is more complex than Rosenberg acknowledges. Finally, we claim that an explanation for why Rosenberg's argument appears persuasive and appealing is that the argument is based on an inflated concept of multiple realizability that rests on unreliable intuitions concerning what counts as a different realization of the same property. Consequently, we argue that the argument is at best inconclusive and at worst false insofar as its implications for the existence of biological laws are concerned.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, History, Culture, and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, PO Box 24 (Unioninkatu 40 A), 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland.
authors.forename: Jani P
authors.initials: JP
authors.lastname: Raerinne
authors.forename: Markus I
authors.initials: MI
authors.lastname: Eronen
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D001695:Biology; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition; D019368:Nature; D010684:Philosophy; D012641:Selection, Genetic