title: Infanticide and moral consistency.
abstract: The aim of this essay is to show that there are no easy options for those who are disturbed by the suggestion that infanticide may on occasion be morally permissible. The belief that infanticide is always wrong is doubtfully compatible with a range of widely shared moral beliefs that underlie various commonly accepted practices. Any set of beliefs about the morality of abortion, infanticide and the killing of animals that is internally consistent and even minimally credible will therefore unavoidably contain some beliefs that are counterintuitive.
authors: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA. mcmahan@philosophy.rutgers.edu
authors: Jeff
authors: J
authors: McMahan
mesh_terms: D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D000367:Age Factors; D000818:Animals; D033421:Beginning of Human Life; D003071:Cognition; D003243:Consciousness; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D005328:Fetal Viability; D005333:Fetus; D005858:Germany; D006708:Homicide; D040821:Human Characteristics; D006801:Humans; D007223:Infant; D007231:Infant, Newborn; D007237:Infanticide / Q000941:ethics*; D007603:Jurisprudence; D028681:Moral Obligations; D009014:Morals; D002679:Pan troglodytes; D012941:Social Responsibility; D014481:United States; D026712:Value of Life
keywords: Abortion; Embryos and Fetuses; Philosophical Ethics; Quality/Value of Life/Personhood