title: Taking 'know' for an answer: a reply to Nagel, San Juan, and Mar.
abstract: Nagel, San Juan, and Mar report an experiment investigating lay attributions of knowledge, belief, and justification. They suggest that, in keeping with the expectations of philosophers, but contra recent empirical findings [Starmans, C. & Friedman, O. (2012). The folk conception of knowledge. Cognition, 124, 272-283], laypeople consistently deny knowledge in Gettier cases, regardless of whether the beliefs are based on 'apparent' or 'authentic' evidence. In this reply, we point out that Nagel et al. employed a questioning method that biased participants to deny knowledge. Moreover, careful examination of participants' responses reveals that they attributed knowledge in Gettier cases. We also note that Nagel et al. misconstrue the distinction between 'apparent' and 'authentic' evidence, and use scenarios that do not feature the structure that characterizes most Gettier cases. We conclude that NS&M's findings are fully compatible with the claim that laypeople attribute knowledge in Gettier cases in general, but are significantly less likely to attribute knowledge when a belief is generated based on apparent evidence.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Yale University, USA. Electronic address: christina.starmans@yale.edu.
authors.forename: Christina
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Starmans
authors.forename: Ori
authors.initials: O
authors.lastname: Friedman
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D003469:Culture; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition / Q000502:physiology*; D019359:Knowledge; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Epistemic intuitions; Folk psychology; Gettier cases; Knowledge; Lay theories; Theory of mind