title: Environmental perverse incentives in coastal monitoring.
abstract: It can be argued that the intensity of monitoring of coastal marine environments lags behind the equivalent terrestrial environments. This results in a paucity of long-term time series of key environmental parameters such as turbidity. This lack of management information of the sources and sinks, and causes and impacts of stressors to the coastal marine environment, along with a lack of co-ordination of information collection is compromising the ability of environmental impact assessments of major coastal developments to discriminate between local and remote anthropogenic impacts, and natural or background processes. In particular, the quasi outsourcing of the collection of coastal information can lead to a perverse incentive whereby in many cases nobody is actively or consistently monitoring the coastal marine environment effectively. This is particularly the case with regards to the collection of long-term and whole-of-system scale data. This lack of effective monitoring can act to incentivise poor environmental performance.
authors.affiliation: University of Queensland, School of Mathematics and Physics, St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia. Mark.Gibbs@aecom.com
authors.forename: Mark T
authors.initials: MT
authors.lastname: Gibbs
mesh_terms: D003247:Conservation of Natural Resources; D004784:Environmental Monitoring / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D058735:Environmental Policy; D009042:Motivation; D012623:Seawater / Q000737:chemistry; D014873:Water Pollutants / Q000032:analysis; D014876:Water Pollution / Q000032:analysis / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*
chemical_list: D014873:Water Pollutants
keywords: Coastal management; Coastal monitoring; Impacts of dredging; Perverse incentives