title: A tale of two contribution mechanisms for nonlinear public goods.
abstract: Amounts of empirical evidence, ranging from microbial cooperation to collective hunting, suggests public goods produced often nonlinearly depend on the total amount of contribution. The implication of such nonlinear public goods for the evolution of cooperation is not well understood. There is also little attention paid to the divisibility nature of individual contribution amount, divisible vs. non-divisible ones. The corresponding strategy space in the former is described by a continuous investment while in the latter by a continuous probability to contribute all or nothing. Here, we use adaptive dynamics in finite populations to quantify and compare the roles nonlinearity of public-goods production plays in cooperation between these two contribution mechanisms. Although under both contribution mechanisms the population can converge into a coexistence equilibrium with an intermediate cooperation level, the branching phenomenon only occurs in the divisible contribution mechanism. The results shed insight into understanding observed individual difference in cooperative behavior.
authors.affiliation: Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China. yanlzhang@pku.edu.cn
authors.forename: Yanling
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Zhang
authors.forename: Feng
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Fu
authors.forename: Te
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Wu
authors.forename: Guangming
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Xie
authors.forename: Long
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Wang