title: Intermediate representations exclude embodiment.
abstract: Given that Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) account integrates language production and comprehension, it is reasonable to ask whether it is compatible with embodied cognition. I argue that its dependence on rich intermediate representations of linguistic structure excludes embodiment. Two options are available to supporters of embodied cognition: They can adopt a more liberal notion of embodiment or they can attempt to replace these intermediate representations with robustly embodied ones. Both of these options face challenges.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA. guy.dove@louisville.edu
authors.forename: Guy
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Dove
mesh_terms: D032882:Comprehension / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D013060:Speech / Q000502:physiology*; D013067:Speech Perception / Q000502:physiology*