title: Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience.
abstract: Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied in isolation. Contingency is central for converging first- and second-person approaches. Studies of embodiment show how contingencies scaffold first-person perspective and how the transition from a third- to a second-person perspective fundamentally involves first-person contributions.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. m.longo@bbk.ac.uk
authors.forename: Matthew R
authors.initials: MR
authors.lastname: Longo
authors.forename: Manos
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Tsakiris
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D059167:Mirror Neurons / Q000502:physiology*; D012938:Social Perception; D056345:Theory of Mind / Q000502:physiology*