title: A second-person approach cannot explain intentionality in social understanding.
abstract: A second-person approach that prioritizes dyadic emotional interaction is not well equipped to explain the origins of the understanding of mind conceived as intentionality. Instead, the critical elements that will deliver the understanding of self and other as persons with intentionality are shared object-centered interactions that include not only emotional engagement, but also joint attention and joint goal-directed action.
authors.affiliation: Psychology Department, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada. moorec@dal.ca
authors.forename: Chris
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Moore
authors.forename: Markus
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Paulus
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D059167:Mirror Neurons / Q000502:physiology*; D012938:Social Perception; D056345:Theory of Mind / Q000502:physiology*