A ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals.
Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme that is able to account for the most variegated usage of conditionals. The Ramsey test is only the first option. Relevance is another, familiar, but little understood item, which comes in several versions. This article adds a further family of expressive options, which is able to subsume also counterfactuals and causal conditionals, and indicates at the end how this family allows for partial recovery of truth conditions for conditionals.
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany. wolfgang.spohn@uni-konstanz.de
Wolfgang
W
Spohn
D032882:Comprehension; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011337:Probability Learning; D011338:Probability Theory; D012660:Semantics
Conditional belief; Conditionals; Counterfactuals; Expressivism; Ramsey test; Ranking theory; Relevance; Truth conditions for conditionals