When does information about causal structure improve statistical reasoning?
Base rate neglect on the mammography problem can be overcome by explicitly presenting a causal basis for the typically vague false-positive statistic. One account of this causal facilitation effect is that people make probabilistic judgements over intuitive causal models parameterized with the evidence in the problem. Poorly defined or difficult-to-map evidence interferes with this process, leading to errors in statistical reasoning. To assess whether the construction of parameterized causal representations is an intuitive or deliberative process, in Experiment 1 we combined a secondary load paradigm with manipulations of the presence or absence of an alternative cause in typical statistical reasoning problems. We found limited effects of a secondary load, no evidence that information about an alternative cause improves statistical reasoning, but some evidence that it reduces base rate neglect errors. In Experiments 2 and 3 where we did not impose a load, we observed causal facilitation effects. The amount of Bayesian responding in the causal conditions was impervious to the presence of a load (Experiment 1) and to the precise statistical information that was presented (Experiment 3). However, we found less Bayesian responding in the causal condition than previously reported. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and the suggestion that there may be population effects in the accuracy of statistical reasoning.
a School of Psychology , Queen's University Belfast , Belfast , UK.
Simon
S
McNair
Aidan
A
Feeney
D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D001499:Bayes Theorem; D032764:Casuistry; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011337:Probability Learning; D011340:Problem Solving; D055815:Young Adult