Direct reciprocity in spatial populations enhances R-reciprocity as well as ST-reciprocity.
As is well-known, spatial reciprocity plays an important role in facilitating the emergence of cooperative traits, and the effect of direct reciprocity is also obvious for explaining the cooperation dynamics. However, how the combination of these two scenarios influences cooperation is still unclear. In the present work, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2 × 2 games via considering both spatial structured populations and direct reciprocity driven by the strategy with 1-memory length. Our results show that cooperation can be significantly facilitated on the whole parameter plane. For prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation dominates the system even at strong dilemma, where maximal social payoff is still realized. In this sense, R-reciprocity forms and it is robust to the extremely strong dilemma. Interestingly, when turning to chicken game, we find that ST-reciprocity is also guaranteed, through which social average payoff and cooperation is greatly enhanced. This reciprocity mechanism is supported by mean-field analysis and different interaction topologies. Thus, our study indicates that direct reciprocity in structured populations can be regarded as a more powerful factor for the sustainability of cooperation.
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka, Japan.
Kohei
K
Miyaji
Jun
J
Tanimoto
Zhen
Z
Wang
Aya
A
Hagishima
Naoki
N
Ikegaya
D000465:Algorithms; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008568:Memory; D008954:Models, Biological; D012919:Social Behavior