Static cooperator-defector patterns in models of the snowdrift game played on cycle graphs.
Evolutionary graph theory is an extension of evolutionary game theory in which each individual agent, represented by a node, interacts only with a subset of the entire population to which it belongs (i.e., those to which it is connected by edges). In the context of the evolution of cooperation, in which individuals playing the cooperator strategy interact with individuals playing the defector strategy and game payoffs are equated with fitness, evolutionary games on graphs lead to global standoffs (i.e., static patterns) when all cooperators in a population have the same payoff as any defectors with which they share an edge. I consider the simplest type of regular-connected graph, the cycle graph, in which every node has exactly two edges (k = 2), for the prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game, the two most important pairwise games in cooperation theory. I show that for simplified payoff structures associated with these games, standoffs are only possible for two valid cost-benefit ratios in the snowdrift game. I further show that only the greater of these two cost-benefit ratios is likely to be attracting in most situations (i.e., likely to spontaneously result in a global standoff when starting from nonstandoff conditions). Numerical simulations confirm this prediction. This work contributes to our understanding of the evolution of pattern formation in games played in finite, sparsely connected populations.
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada T1K 3M4. robert.laird@uleth.ca
Robert A
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Laird
D003196:Computer Graphics; D005716:Game Theory; D008962:Models, Theoretical