title: What can information-asymmetric games tell us about the context of Crick's 'frozen accident'?
abstract: This paper describes a novel application of information-asymmetric (signalling) games to molecular biology in which utility is determined by the message complexity (rate) in addition to the error in information transfer (distortion). We show using a computational model how it is possible for the agents in one such game to evolve a signalling convention (separating equilibrium) that is suboptimal in terms of information transfer, but is nonetheless stable. In the context of an RNA world merging with a nascent amino acid one, such a game's equilibrium is alluded to by the genetic code, which is nearly optimal in terms of information transfer, but is also near-universal and nearly immutable. Such a framework suggests that cellularity may have emerged to encourage coordination between RNA species and sheds light on other aspects of RNA world biochemistry yet to be fully understood.
authors.affiliation: Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA. justin.jee@med.nyu.edu
authors.forename: Justin
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Jee
authors.forename: Andrew
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Sundstrom
authors.forename: Steven E
authors.initials: SE
authors.lastname: Massey
authors.forename: Bud
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Mishra
mesh_terms: D003198:Computer Simulation; D019143:Evolution, Molecular; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D012313:RNA / Q000502:physiology*
chemical_list: D012313:RNA
keywords: RNA world; genetic code; information-asymmetric games; signalling