title: Authentic Gettier cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman.
abstract: Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking 'authentic evidence' Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between 'authentic evidence' and 'apparent evidence'. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.
authors.affiliation: University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George St., Toronto, ON, Canada M5R 2M8. Electronic address: jennifer.nagel@utoronto.ca.
authors.forename: Jennifer
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Nagel
authors.forename: Raymond
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Mar
authors.forename: Valerie
authors.initials: V
authors.lastname: San Juan
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D003469:Culture; D006801:Humans; D019359:Knowledge; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Gettier cases; Knowledge ascription; Lay beliefs; Mental state inference