Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: a new experimental paradigm for consciousness research.
The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the Reflexive Imagery Task, a paradigm in which, as a function of external control, conscious content is triggered reliably and unintentionally: When instructed to not subvocalize the name of a stimulus object, participants reliably failed to suppress the set-related imagery. This stimulus-elicited content is considered 'high-level' content and, in terms of stages of processing, occurs late in the processing stream. We discuss the implications of this paradigm for consciousness research.
Departments of Psychology and Philosophy, San Francisco State University, United States.
Allison K
AK
Allen
Kevin
K
Wilkins
Adam
A
Gazzaley
Ezequiel
E
Morsella
D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D007092:Imagination / Q000502:physiology*; D007266:Inhibition, Psychological; D012018:Reflex; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology; D014473:Unconscious, Psychology
Action sets; Consciousness; Imagery; Implementation intentions; Ironic processing; Unconscious processes