title: Skepticism, empathy, and animal suffering.
abstract: The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legislative change. Yet, despite this growing concern, skepticism toward such suffering is still surprisingly common. This paper analyzes the merits of the skeptical approach, both in its moderate and extreme forms. In the first part it is claimed that the type of criterion for verification concerning the mental states of other animals posed by skepticism is overly (and, in the case of extreme skepticism, illogically) demanding. Resting on Wittgenstein and Husserl, it is argued that skepticism relies on a misguided epistemology and, thus, that key questions posed by it face the risk of absurdity. In the second part of the paper it is suggested that, instead of skepticism, empathy together with intersubjectivity be adopted. Edith Stein's take on empathy, along with contemporary findings, are explored, and the claim is made that it is only via these two methods of understanding that the suffering of nonhuman animals can be perceived.
authors.affiliation: Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, P.O. Box 1627, 70211, Kuopio, Finland, elanaa@utu.fi.
authors.forename: Elisa
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Aaltola
mesh_terms: D000827:Animal Welfare; D000818:Animals; D001675:Bioethics; D004645:Empathy; D006801:Humans; D019359:Knowledge; D010465:Perception; D013315:Stress, Psychological