title: The effect of different methods of remuneration on the behaviour of primary care dentists.
abstract: BACKGROUND
  Methods of remuneration have been linked with the professional behaviour of primary care physicians. In dentistry, this can be exacerbated as clinicians operate their practices as businesses and take the full financial risk of the provision of services. The main methods for remunerating primary care dentists include fee-for-service, fixed salary and capitation payments. The aim of this review was to determine the impact that these remuneration mechanisms have upon primary care dentists' behaviour.
  
  
  OBJECTIVE
  To evaluate the effects of different methods of remuneration on the level and mix of activities provided by primary care dentists and the impact this has on patient outcomes.
  
  
  METHODS
  We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Group Specialised Register; the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL, The Cochrane Library, Issue 7, 2013); MEDLINE (Ovid) (1947 to 11 June 2013); EMBASE (Ovid) (1947 to 11 June 2013); EconLit (1969 to 11 June 2013); the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (EED) (11 June 2013); and the Health Economic Evaluations Database (HEED) (11 June 2013). We conducted cited reference searches for the included studies in ISI Web of Knowledge; searched grey literature sources; handsearched selected journals; and contacted authors of relevant studies.
  
  
  METHODS
  Primary care dentists were defined as clinicians that deliver routine or mainstream dental care in a primary care environment. We included randomised controlled trials (RCTs), non-randomised controlled clinical trials (NRCTs), controlled before-after (CBA) studies and interrupted time series (ITS) studies. The methods of remuneration that we considered were: fee-for-service, fixed salary and capitation payments. Primary outcome measures were: measures of clinical activity; volume of clinical activity undertaken; time taken and clinical session length, or both; clinician type utilised; measures of health service utilisation; access and attendance as a proportion of the population; re-attendance rates; recall frequency; levels of oral health inequalities; non-attendance rates; healthcare costs; measures of patient outcomes; disease reduction; health maintenance; and patient satisfaction. We also considered measures of practice profitability/income and any reported unintended effects of the included methods of remuneration.
  
  
  METHODS
  Three of the review authors (PRB, JP, AMG) independently reviewed titles and abstracts and resolved disagreements by discussion. The same three review authors undertook data extraction and assessed the quality of the evidence from all the studies that met the selection criteria, according to Cochrane Collaboration procedures.
  
  
  RESULTS
  Two cluster-RCTs, with data from 503 dental practices, representing 821 dentists and 4771 patients, met the selection criteria. We judged the risk of bias to be high for both studies and the overall quality of the evidence was low/very low for all outcomes, as assessed using the GRADE approach.One study used a factorial design to investigate the impact of fee-for-service and an educational intervention on the placement of fissure sealants in permanent molar teeth. The authors reported a statistically significant increase in clinical activity in the arm that was incentivised with a fee-for-service payment. However, the study was conducted in the four most deprived areas of Scotland, so the applicability of the findings to other settings may be limited. The study did not report data on measures of health service utilisation or measures of patient outcomes.The second study used a parallel group design undertaken over a three-year period to compare the impact of capitation payments with fee-for-service payments on primary care dentists' clinical activity. The study reported on measures of clinical activity (mean percentage of children receiving active preventive advice, health service utilisation (mean number of visits), patient outcomes (mean number of filled teeth, mean percentage of children having one or more teeth extracted and the mean number of decayed teeth) and healthcare costs (mean expenditure). Teeth were restored at a later stage in the disease process in the capitation system and the clinicians tended to see their patients less frequently and tended to carry out fewer fillings and extractions, but also tended to give more preventive advice.There was insufficient information regarding the cost-effectiveness of the different remuneration methods.
  
  
  CONCLUSIONS
  Financial incentives within remuneration systems may produce changes to clinical activity undertaken by primary care dentists. However, the number of included studies is limited and the quality of the evidence from the two included studies was low/very low for all outcomes. Further experimental research in this area is highly recommended given the potential impact of financial incentives on clinical activity, and particular attention should be paid to the impact this has on patient outcomes.
authors.affiliation: School of Dentistry, The University of Manchester, Coupland III Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, UK, M13 9PL.
authors.forename: Paul
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Brocklehurst
authors.forename: Juliet
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Price
authors.forename: Anne-Marie
authors.initials: AM
authors.lastname: Glenny
authors.forename: Martin
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Tickle
authors.forename: Stephen
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Birch
authors.forename: Elizabeth
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Mertz
authors.forename: Jostein
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Grytten
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D002204:Capitation Fee; D002648:Child; D003729:Dental Care / Q000191:economics / Q000379:methods / Q000523:psychology; D003815:Dentists / Q000191:economics* / Q000523:psychology*; D018588:Fee-for-Service Plans; D006801:Humans; D016032:Randomized Controlled Trials as Topic; D060926:Remuneration; D012456:Salaries and Fringe Benefits