Reproductive autonomy as self-making: procreative liberty and the practice of ethical subjectivity.
In this article, I consider recent debates on the notion of procreative liberty, to argue that reproductive freedom can be understood as a form of positive freedom-that is, the freedom to make oneself according to various ethical and aesthetic principles or values. To make this argument, I draw on Michel Foucault's later work on ethics. Both adopting and adapting Foucault's notion of ethics as a practice of the self and of liberty, I argue that reproductive autonomy requires enactment to gain meaning within the life contexts of prospective parents. Thus, I propose a shift away from the standard negative model of freedom that sees it solely as a matter of noninterference or nonimpedance, a view advocated by major commentators such as John Harris and John Robertson. Instead, reproduction should be understood as a deeply personal project of self-making that integrates both negative and positive freedom.
*Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia. Catherine.Mills@monash.edu.
Catherine
C
Mills
D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics; D005610:Freedom; D024861:Genetic Enhancement / Q000941:ethics; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D011057:Politics; D046269:Reproductive Rights / Q000941:ethics*
Michel Foucault; autonomy; ethics of the self; reproductive liberty