Opportunistic migration in spatial evolutionary games.
We study evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. Using the imitation of the best rule for strategy revision, it is shown that cooperation may evolve and be stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game space for several migration distances but only for small game interaction radius while the Stag Hunt class of games become fully cooperative. We also show that only a few trials are needed for cooperation to evolve, i.e., searching costs are not an issue. When the stochastic Fermi strategy update protocol is used cooperation cannot evolve in the Prisoner's Dilemma if the selection intensity is high in spite of opportunistic migration. However, when imitation becomes more random, fully or partially cooperative states are reached in all games for all migration distances tested and for short to intermediate interaction radii.
Information Systems Institute, HEC, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
Pierre
P
Buesser
Marco
M
Tomassini
Alberto
A
Antonioni
D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008124:Locomotion; D013997:Time Factors