Effects of adaptive dynamical linking in networked games.
The role of dynamical topologies in the evolution of cooperation has received considerable attention, as some studies have demonstrated that dynamical networks are much better than static networks in terms of boosting cooperation. Here we study a dynamical model of evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks in which there are no permanent partners to each agent. Whenever a new link is created, its duration is randomly assigned without any bias or preference. We allow the agent to adaptively adjust the duration of each link during the evolution in accordance with the feedback from game interactions. By Monte Carlo simulations, we find that cooperation can be remarkably promoted by this adaptive dynamical linking mechanism both for the game of pairwise interactions, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), and for the game of group interactions, illustrated by the public goods game (PGG). And the faster the adjusting rate, the more successful the evolution of cooperation. We also show that in this context weak selection favors cooperation much more than strong selection does. What is particularly meaningful is that the prosperity of cooperation in this study indicates that the rationality and selfishness of a single agent in adjusting social ties can lead to the progress of altruism of the whole population.
Center for Complex Systems, Department of Automatic Control Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China.
Zhihu
Z
Yang
Zhi
Z
Li
Te
T
Wu
Long
L
Wang