title: Irrational Blame.
abstract: I clarify some ambiguities in blame-talk and argue that blame's potential for irrationality and propensity to sting vitiates accounts of blame that identify it with consciously accessible, personal-level judgements or beliefs. Drawing on the cognitive psychology of emotion and appraisal theory, I develop an account of blame that accommodates these features. I suggest that blame consists in a range of hostile, negative first-order emotions, towards which the blamer has a specific, accompanying second-order attitude, namely, a feeling of entitlement - a feeling that these hostile, negative first-order emotions are what the blamed object deserves.
authors.affiliation: Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, 16/17 St Ebbe's Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, hanna.pickard@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.
authors.forename: Hanna
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Pickard
keywords: belief; blame; emotion; irrationality; judgment