title: Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment.
abstract: Individuals usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. This missing second-order peer punishment is a fundamental problem for the stabilization of cooperation. To solve this problem, most societies today have implemented central authorities that punish free riders and tax evaders alike, such that second-order punishment is fully established. The emergence of such stable authorities from individual decisions, however, creates a new paradox: it seems absurd to expect individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment to strive for an authority that does. Herein, we provide a mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways. When subjects can migrate continuously to either community, we identify a bias toward institutions that do not punish tax evaders. When subjects have to vote once for all rounds of the game and have to accept the decision of the majority, they prefer a society with second-order punishment. These findings uncover the existence of a democracy premium. The majority-voting rule allows subjects to commit themselves and to implement institutions that eventually lead to a higher welfare for all.
authors.affiliation: Evolutionary Theory Group and Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
authors.forename: Christian
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Hilbe
authors.forename: Arne
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Traulsen
authors.forename: Torsten
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Röhl
authors.forename: Manfred
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Milinski
mesh_terms: D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003709:Democracy; D005858:Germany; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011057:Politics; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D011049:Social Control Policies
keywords: evolution of cooperation; institution formation; pool punishment