Managing genetic tests, surveillance, and preventive medicine under a public health insurance system.
There is a prospect in the medium to long term future of substantial advancements in the understanding of the relationship between disease and genetics. We consider the implications of increased information from genetic tests about predisposition to diseases from the perspective of managing health care provision under a public health insurance scheme. In particular, we consider how such information may potentially improve the targeting of medical surveillance (or prevention) activities to improve the chances of early detection of disease onset. We show that the moral hazard implications inherent in surveillance and prevention decisions that are chosen to be privately rather than socially optimal may be exacerbated by increased information about person-specific predisposition to disease.
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Augsburg, Universitätsstr. 2, 86159 Augsburg, Deutschland.
Lilia
L
Filipova-Neumann
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Canada. Electronic address: mhoy@uoguelph.ca.
Michael
M
Hoy
D030342:Genetic Diseases, Inborn / Q000175:diagnosis* / Q000191:economics / Q000235:genetics; D020022:Genetic Predisposition to Disease / Q000235:genetics; D005820:Genetic Testing / Q000191:economics; D006801:Humans; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration*; D018803:Models, Economic; D011159:Population Surveillance; D011315:Preventive Medicine / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration*
Genetic tests; Medical surveillance; Moral Hazard; Public health insurance; Value of Information