Exaptation, adaptation, and evolutionary psychology.
One of the most well known methodological criticisms of evolutionary psychology is Gould's claim that the program pays too much attention to adaptations, and not enough to exaptations. Almost as well known is the standard rebuttal of that criticism: namely, that the study of exaptations in fact depends on the study of adaptations. However, as I try to show in this paper, it is premature to think that this is where this debate ends. First, the notion of exaptation that is commonly used in this debate is different from the one that Gould and Vrba originally defined. Noting this is particularly important, since, second, the standard reply to Gould's criticism only works if the criticism is framed in terms of the former notion of exaptation, and not the latter. However, third, this ultimately does not change the outcome of the debate much, as evolutionary psychologists can respond to the revamped criticism of their program by claiming that the original notion of exaptation is theoretically and empirically uninteresting. By discussing these issues further, I also seek to determine, more generally, which ways of approaching the adaptationism debate in evolutionary biology are useful, and which not.
Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, UK. a.w.schulz@lse.ac.uk
Armin
A
Schulz
D000220:Adaptation, Biological; D000223:Adaptation, Psychological; D005075:Biological Evolution; D001695:Biology / Q000266:history*; D049673:History, 20th Century; D049674:History, 21st Century; D006801:Humans; D011584:Psychology / Q000266:history*