Corruption drives the emergence of civil society.
Centralized sanctioning institutions have been shown to emerge naturally through social learning, displace all other forms of punishment and lead to stable cooperation. However, this result provokes a number of questions. If centralized sanctioning is so successful, then why do many highly authoritarian states suffer from low levels of cooperation? Why do states with high levels of public good provision tend to rely more on citizen-driven peer punishment? Here, we consider how corruption influences the evolution of cooperation and punishment. Our model shows that the effectiveness of centralized punishment in promoting cooperation breaks down when some actors in the model are allowed to bribe centralized authorities. Counterintuitively, a weaker centralized authority is actually more effective because it allows peer punishment to restore cooperation in the presence of corruption. Our results provide an evolutionary rationale for why public goods provision rarely flourishes in polities that rely only on strong centralized institutions. Instead, cooperation requires both decentralized and centralized enforcement. These results help to explain why citizen participation is a fundamental necessity for policing the commons.
Informatics Department, The British University in Dubai, , Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Sherief
S
Abdallah
Rasha
R
Sayed
Iyad
I
Rahwan
Brad L
BL
Leveck
Manuel
M
Cebrian
Alex
A
Rutherford
James H
JH
Fowler
D003415:Crime; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011678:Punishment
evolutionary dynamics; politics; social learning