Influence of stochastic perturbation of both action updating and strategy updating in mixed-strategy 2×2 games on evolution of cooperation.
In a mixed-strategy game framework, each agent's strategy is defined by a real number; on the other hand, in a discrete strategy game framework, only binary strategies, either cooperation or defection, are allowed. In a spatial mixed-strategy game, with respect to the process for updating action (offer), either a synchronous or an asynchronous strategy update should be presumed. This study elucidates how stochastic perturbation that results from a synchronous or an asynchronous process for updating action significantly affects the enhancement of cooperation in an evolutionary process. Especially, when a synchronous process for updating action is assumed, the extent of cooperation increases with an increase in degree.
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
Kohei
K
Miyaji
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
Jun
J
Tanimoto
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
Aya
A
Hagishima
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
Naoki
N
Ikegaya