title: Autonomy, natality and freedom: a liberal re-examination of Habermas in the enhancement debate.
abstract: Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments 'the argument from negative freedom' and 'the argument from natality'. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.
authors.forename: Jonathan
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Pugh
mesh_terms: D034462:Dissent and Disputes; D005610:Freedom; D024861:Genetic Enhancement; D018095:Germ-Line Mutation; D006801:Humans; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011057:Politics; D012931:Social Environment
keywords: Habermas; autonomy; enhancement