title: Signature limits in mindreading systems.
abstract: Recent evidence that young children seem to both understand false belief in one sense, but not in another, has led to two-systems theorizing about mindreading. By analyzing the most detailed two-systems approach in studying social cognition-the theory of mindreading defended by Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill-I argue that that even when dutifully constructed, two-systems approaches in social cognition struggle to adequately define the mindreading systems in terms of signature processing limits, an issue that becomes most apparent when investigating mindreading in infancy. I end the article by developing several challenges that face any two-systems account of mindreading.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy and Religion, Mississippi State University.
authors.forename: J Robert
authors.initials: JR
authors.lastname: Thompson
mesh_terms: D002648:Child; D002657:Child Development; D002675:Child, Preschool; D006801:Humans; D007223:Infant; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012938:Social Perception; D056345:Theory of Mind
keywords: Development; False belief; Theory of mind; Two-systems theories