title: Autonomy in chimpanzees.
abstract: Literature on the mental capacities and cognitive mechanisms of the great apes has been silent about whether they can act autonomously. This paper provides a philosophical theory of autonomy supported by psychological studies of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie chimpanzee behavior to argue that chimpanzees can act autonomously even though their psychological mechanisms differ from those of humans. Chimpanzees satisfy the two basic conditions of autonomy: (1) liberty (the absence of controlling influences) and (2) agency (self-initiated intentional action), each of which is specified here in terms of conditions of understanding, intention, and self-control. In this account, chimpanzees make knowledge-based choices reflecting a richly information-based and socially sophisticated understanding of the world. Finally, two major theories of autonomy (Kantian theory and two-level theory) are rejected as too narrow to adequately address these issues, necessitating the modifications made in the present approach.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, 425 Healy Bldg, Washington, DC, 20057, USA, beauchat@georgetown.edu.
authors.forename: Tom L
authors.initials: TL
authors.lastname: Beauchamp
authors.forename: Victoria
authors.initials: V
authors.lastname: Wobber
mesh_terms: D000819:Animal Communication; D032761:Animal Experimentation / Q000941:ethics*; D000818:Animals; D001522:Behavior, Animal; D002755:Choice Behavior; D003071:Cognition; D032882:Comprehension; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D005610:Freedom; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D009014:Morals; D015969:National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, U.S., Health and Medicine Division; D002679:Pan troglodytes; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D014481:United States; D014836:Volition