Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia.
Seth extends predictive processing with counterfactuals: Encoded probabilities of what would occur given a repertoire of possible (but unexecuted) actions. He thereby provides a neat mathematical formulation of the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence, i.e., of the fact that we perceive a whole object while being limited to seeing it from a perspective. Synesthetic concurrents are explained in terms of impoverished counterfactuals. I argue that this explanation misses its target, because it only accounts for a lack of objecthood. Enactive theory is better suited to explain concurrents' lack of subjectivity veridicality. The world itself shapes experience only during veridical perception.
a Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad Universitaria , DF , Mexico.
Tom
T
Froese
D006801:Humans; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D010468:Perceptual Disorders / Q000503:physiopathology*; D010775:Photic Stimulation; D000080311:Synesthesia