How does the brain encode epistemic reliability? Perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, and counterfactual richness.
Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are determined by the unavailability of earlier processing stages to attention. Counterfactual richness and attentional unavailability may both be indicators of the overall processing level currently achieved, a functional property that normally correlates with epistemic reliability. Perceptual presence as well as phenomenal transparency express epistemic reliability on the level of conscious processing.
a Philosophisches Seminar, Gutenberg Research College , Johannes Gutenberg-Universität , Mainz , Germany.
Thomas
T
Metzinger
D006801:Humans; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D010468:Perceptual Disorders / Q000503:physiopathology*; D010775:Photic Stimulation; D000080311:Synesthesia