The responsibility objection to abortion: rejecting the notion that the responsibility objection successfully refutes a woman's right to choose.
This article considers the objection to abortion that a woman who voluntarily engages in sexual activity is responsible for her fetus and so cannot have an abortion. The conclusion argued for is that the conceptions of responsibility that can ground the objection that are considered do not necessitate a requirement on the part of a pregnant woman to carry her pregnancy to term. Thus, the iterations of the responsibility objection presented cannot be used to curtail reproductive choice.
Ian
I
McDaniel
D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics* / Q000379:methods; D000022:Abortion, Spontaneous; D002755:Choice Behavior / Q000941:ethics*; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D020883:Hysterotomy; D011247:Pregnancy; D037841:Pregnant People / Q000523:psychology; D012941:Social Responsibility; D014933:Women's Rights
Thomson; abortion; care; consent; harm; negligence; responsibility