Academic freedom, public reactions, and anonymity.
Academic freedom can be defined as immunity against adverse reactions from the general public, designed to keep scholars unintimidated and productive even after they have published controversial ideas. Francesca Minerva claims that this notion of strict instrumental academic freedom is supported by Ronald Dworkin, and that anonymity would effectively defend the sphere of immunity implied by it. Against this, I argue that the idea defended by Minerva finds no support in the work by Dworkin referred to; that anonymity would not in most cases effectively protect the kind of immunity sought after; and that in some cases it would not even be desirable to protect scholars from public reactions to their controversial claims.
Matti
M
Häyry
D001319:Authorship; D034462:Dissent and Disputes; D005610:Freedom; D006801:Humans; D008402:Mass Media; D011639:Public Opinion; D011643:Publishing; D058028:Research Report
Alberto Giubiliani; Francesca Minerva; Fritz Machlup; John Stuart Mill; Ronald Dworkin; academic freedom; anonymity; controversial ideas; ethical individualism; individual responsibility; public reactions