Should an individual composed of selfish goals be held responsible for her actions?
We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the "locus problem." In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906-2098. nataliatwashington@gmail.com drkelly@purdue.edu http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
Natalia
N
Washington
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906-2098. nataliatwashington@gmail.com drkelly@purdue.edu http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
Daniel
D
Kelly
D001519:Behavior / Q000502:physiology*; D005260:Female; D006040:Goals; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment / Q000502:physiology*; D009042:Motivation / Q000502:physiology*