Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwise.
The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to inhibit progress in cognitive science. Severing the commitment to this taxonomy would allow Huang & Bargh (H&B) to consider a wider variety of representational forms with motivational force and to entertain the intriguing possibility that variations in the number of active-but-redundant representations account for variance in social behavior.
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20067. lbh24@georgetown.edu http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/lbh24/
Bryce
B
Huebner
Department of Philosophy and Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309-0232. robert.rupert@colorado.edu http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/fac_rupert.shtml.
Robert D
RD
Rupert
D001519:Behavior / Q000502:physiology*; D005260:Female; D006040:Goals; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment / Q000502:physiology*; D009042:Motivation / Q000502:physiology*