title: Mean-field games for marriage.
abstract: This article examines mean-field games for marriage. The results support the argument that optimizing the long-term well-being through effort and social feeling state distribution (mean-field) will help to stabilize marriage. However, if the cost of effort is very high, the couple fluctuates in a bad feeling state or the marriage breaks down. We then examine the influence of society on a couple using mean-field sentimental games. We show that, in mean-field equilibrium, the optimal effort is always higher than the one-shot optimal effort. We illustrate numerically the influence of the couple's network on their feeling states and their well-being.
authors.affiliation: Dipartimento di Ingegneria Chimica, Gestionale, Informatica, Meccanica, Palermo, Italy.
authors.forename: Dario
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Bauso
authors.affiliation: SRI Center for Uncertainty Quantification in Computational Science and Engineering, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, Thuwal, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
authors.forename: Ben Mansour
authors.initials: BM
authors.lastname: Dia
authors.affiliation: Department of Mathematics, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden.
authors.forename: Boualem
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Djehiche
authors.affiliation: SRI Center for Uncertainty Quantification in Computational Science and Engineering, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, Thuwal, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
authors.forename: Hamidou
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Tembine
authors.affiliation: SRI Center for Uncertainty Quantification in Computational Science and Engineering, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, Thuwal, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
authors.forename: Raul
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Tempone
mesh_terms: D004644:Emotions / Q000502:physiology; D005195:Family Relations; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D008393:Marriage; D008962:Models, Theoretical