Persons and evidence for death: A reply to Bulzacchelli.
This article is a reply to Bulzacchelli's argument via two routes. First, I argue that Bulzacchelli has not clarified what he means by the two key terms in his argument: person and reduction. Second, and more importantly, I argue that Bulzacchelli's argument involves a contradiction. He seems to think that determining death on the basis of physiological evidence (i.e. the cessation of organismic functioning) is reductionistic. But he also endorses arguments against whole brain death (WBD) and those arguments maintain that because organ systems function (with external support) in the setting of WBD, the person still exists. But to say that the person still exists simply in virtue of organ systems still functioning is the very reduction Bulzacchelli intimates is a problem.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA.
Stephen
S
Napier
Brain death; Shewmon's Challenge; dualism; evidence; persons