Bringing free will down to Earth: people's psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment.
Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will-a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused "first mover," and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people's judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will.
Florida State University, USA. Electronic address: Monroe@psy.fsu.edu.
Andrew E
AE
Monroe
Harvard University, USA.
Kyle D
KD
Dillon
Brown University, USA.
Bertram F
BF
Malle
D000328:Adult; D002755:Choice Behavior; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D008875:Middle Aged; D009014:Morals; D026684:Personal Autonomy
Blame; Choice; Folk concepts; Free will; Intentionality; Moral judgment