Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on evolving random networks.
In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game by incorporating partner choice into the framework of evolutionary game theory. Our research shows that the introduction of partner choice can notably promote the cooperative behavior in the prisoner's dilemma game. All the players are more likely to play the game with cooperators, which makes it easier for cooperators to form alliances. In particular, the system will be dominated completely by cooperators in a comfortable environment (i.e., with lower survival cost) because the cooperators can get more benefits than the defectors in this case due to their good reputation. In addition, we have found that the sustenance of cooperators improves notably as well in the snowdrift game and the stag-hunt game due to this introduction.
School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China.
Zhaojin
Z
Xu
School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin, China 300071.
Yun
Y
Le
School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin, China 300071.
Lianzhong
L
Zhang
D000818:Animals; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003661:Decision Support Techniques; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical