title: The concept of human dignity in the ethics of genetic research.
abstract: Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature - one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent.
authors.forename: David K
authors.initials: DK
authors.lastname: Chan
mesh_terms: D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics*; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D032984:Ethics, Research; D036281:Genetic Research / Q000941:ethics*; D005821:Genetic Techniques / Q000941:ethics*; D015316:Genetic Therapy / Q000941:ethics*; D017408:Guidelines as Topic; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D028723:Personhood
keywords: Aristotle; Kant; genetic research; human dignity; human nature