title: The role of opportunistic migration in cyclic games.
abstract: We study cyclic evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. We find that opportunistic migration can inverse the cyclic prevalence between the strategies when the frequency of random imitation is large enough compared to the payoff-driven imitation. At the transition the average size of the patterns diverges and this threatens diversity of strategies.
authors.affiliation: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
authors.forename: Pierre
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Buesser
authors.affiliation: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
authors.forename: Marco
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Tomassini
mesh_terms: D003198:Computer Simulation; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D009068:Movement