title: Evaluating big deal journal bundles.
abstract: Large commercial publishers sell bundled online subscriptions to their entire list of academic journals at prices significantly lower than the sum of their á la carte prices. Bundle prices differ drastically between institutions, but they are not publicly posted. The data that we have collected enable us to compare the bundle prices charged by commercial publishers with those of nonprofit societies and to examine the types of price discrimination practiced by commercial and nonprofit journal publishers. This information is of interest to economists who study monopolist pricing, librarians interested in making efficient use of library budgets, and scholars who are interested in the availability of the work that they publish.
authors: Economics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93105; tedb@econ.ucsb.edu.
authors: Theodore C
authors: TC
authors: Bergstrom
authors: Gerald Ford School of Public Policy, Economics Department, and School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109;
authors: Paul N
authors: PN
authors: Courant
authors: Strategic Technologies, Google, Mountain View, CA 94043; and.
authors: R Preston
authors: RP
authors: McAfee
authors: Competition Economics LLC, Emeryville, CA 94608.
authors: Michael A
authors: MA
authors: Williams
mesh_terms: D022126:Access to Information; D007993:Libraries, Medical / Q000191:economics*; D009939:Organizations, Nonprofit / Q000191:economics; D010506:Periodicals as Topic / Q000191:economics*; D014481:United States; D014495:Universities / Q000191:economics*
keywords: all-or-nothing price; bargaining; efficiency; information technology; monopoly