title: Disease, dysfunction, and synthetic biology.
abstract: Theorists analyzing the concept of disease on the basis of the notion of dysfunction consider disease to be dysfunction requiring. More specifically, dysfunction-requiring theories of disease claim that for an individual to be diseased certain biological facts about it must be the case. Disease is not wholly a matter of evaluative attitudes. In this paper, I consider the dysfunction-requiring component of Wakefield's hybrid account of disease in light of the artifactual organisms envisioned by current research in synthetic biology. In particular, I argue that the possibility of artifactual organisms and the case of oncomice and other bred or genetically modified strains of organism constitute a significant objection to Wakefield's etiological account of the dysfunction requirement. I then develop a new alternative understanding of the dysfunction requirement that builds on the organizational theory of function. I conclude that my suggestion is superior to Wakefield's theory because it (a) can accommodate both artifactual and naturally evolved organisms, (b) avoids the possibility of there being a conflict between what an organismic part is supposed to do and the health of the organism, and (c) provides a nonarbitrary and practical way of determining whether dysfunction occurs.
authors: University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark suneh@hum.ku.dk.
authors: Sune
authors: S
authors: Holm
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D017849:Animals, Inbred Strains; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D004194:Disease; D006801:Humans; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D058615:Synthetic Biology / Q000941:ethics*
keywords: disease; functions; health; organisms; synthetic biology