title: Cooperation with both synergistic and local interactions can be worse than each alone.
abstract: Cooperation is ubiquitous ranging from multicellular organisms to human societies. Population structures indicating individuals' limited interaction ranges are crucial to understand this issue. But it remains unknown to what extend multiple interactions involving nonlinearity in payoff influence the cooperation in structured populations. Here we show a rule, which determines the emergence and stabilization of cooperation, under multiple discounted, linear, and synergistic interactions. The rule is validated by simulations in homogenous and heterogenous structured populations. We find that the more neighbours there are the harder for cooperation to evolve for multiple interactions with linearity and discounting. For synergistic scenario, however, distinct from its pairwise counterpart, moderate number of neighbours can be the worst, indicating that synergistic interactions work with strangers but not with neighbours. Our results suggest that the combination of different factors which promotes cooperation alone can be worse than that with every single factor.
authors.affiliation: Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, 100871 Beijing, China.
authors.forename: Aming
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Li
authors.affiliation: Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Str. 2, 24306 Plön, Germany.
authors.forename: Bin
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Wu
authors.affiliation: Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, 100871 Beijing, China.
authors.forename: Long
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Wang
mesh_terms: D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003657:Decision Making; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011157:Population Dynamics; D060756:Social Networking