title: Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.
abstract: Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.
authors: CoMPLEX, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK.
authors: Jonathan
authors: J
authors: Bone
authors: Department of Anthropology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK.
authors: Antonio S
authors: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7029-1048
authors: AS
authors: Silva
authors: Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK nicholaraihani@gmail.com.
authors: Nichola J
authors: NJ
authors: Raihani
mesh_terms: D000533:Altruism; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005260:Female; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008297:Male; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*
keywords: cheats; cooperation; norms; punishment; sanction; social