title: Pure science and the problem of progress.
abstract: How should we understand scientific progress? Kuhn famously discussed science as its own internally driven venture, structured by paradigms. He also famously had a problem describing progress in science, as problem-solving ability failed to provide a clear rubric across paradigm change--paradigm changes tossed out problems as well as solving them. I argue here that much of Kuhn's inability to articulate a clear view of scientific progress stems from his focus on pure science and a neglect of applied science. I trace the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, showing how the distinction came about, the rhetorical uses to which the distinction has been put, and how pure science came to be both more valued by scientists and philosophers. I argue that the distinction between pure and applied science does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny, and that once we relinquish it, we can provide Kuhn with a clear sense of scientific progress. It is not one, though, that will ultimately prove acceptable. For that, societal evaluations of scientific work are needed.
authors: Heather
authors: H
authors: Douglas
mesh_terms: D049672:History, 19th Century; D049673:History, 20th Century; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history*; D012106:Research / Q000266:history; D012586:Science / Q000266:history*