title: Ranking games.
abstract: BACKGROUND
  Research rankings based on bibliometrics today dominate governance in academia and determine careers in universities.
  
  
  METHODS
  Analytical approach to capture the incentives by users of rankings and by suppliers of rankings, both on an individual and an aggregate level.
  
  
  RESULTS
  Rankings may produce unintended negative side effects. In particular, rankings substitute the "taste for science" by a "taste for publication." We show that the usefulness of rankings rests on several important assumptions challenged by recent research.
  
  
  CONCLUSIONS
  We suggest as alternatives careful socialization and selection of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. The aim is to encourage controversial discourses in order to contribute meaningful to the advancement of science.
authors.affiliation: Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany CREMA-Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland.
authors.forename: Margit
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Osterloh
authors.affiliation: Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany CREMA-Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland bruno.frey@econ.uzh.ch.
authors.forename: Bruno S
authors.initials: BS
authors.lastname: Frey
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D009042:Motivation; D015588:Observer Variation; D009936:Organizational Innovation; D010380:Peer Review / Q000379:methods*; D011361:Professional Competence / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D011642:Publications / Q000592:standards* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D011643:Publishing / Q000458:organization & administration; D012586:Science / Q000458:organization & administration*; D014495:Universities / Q000458:organization & administration
keywords: academic governance; motivation; rankings; selection; socialization